Strategic behavior and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model

by A. Postlewaite

Publisher: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in [Urbana, Ill.]

Written in English
Cover of: Strategic behavior and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model | A. Postlewaite
Published: Pages: 24 Downloads: 410
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  • Distribution (Probability theory),
  • Social choice

Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references (p. 24).

StatementAndrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler
SeriesFaculty working papers -- no. 544, Faculty working papers -- no. 544.
ContributionsSchmeidler, David, 1939- joint author, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. College of Commerce and Business Administration
The Physical Object
Pagination24 p. ;
Number of Pages24
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL24755458M

Depending on socioeconomic factors like wealth, education, or occupation, people are more or less likely to vote. Wealthier people are more likely to vote, as they generally possess the resources and time to be active in politics. Of all the socioeconomic factors impacting voter turnout, education has the greatest impact. The theory also states that productive efficiency may not be the result of from MGNT at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. This Article offers a novel theory of corporate control. It does so by shedding new light on corporate-ownership structures and challenging the prevailing model of controlling shareholders as essentially opportunistic actors who seek to reap private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Our core claim is that entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows . Read this essay on Evaluate the View That Voting Behaviour in the Usa Is Determined More by the Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Voters Than by Issues, Candidates and Events. (30 Marks). Come browse our large digital warehouse of free sample essays. Get the knowledge you need in order to pass your classes and more. Only at ".

calculus of voting: A model of political voting behavior in which a citizen chooses to vote if the costs of doing so are outweighed by the strength of the citizen's preference for one candidate weighted by the anticipated probability that the citizen's vote will be decisive in the election. This is certainly the case of presidential primaries, and of roll-call voting in legislatures; but it is often the case that even mechanisms that are supposed to be simultaneous, are not in practice, because late voters generally have access to exit polls and other information describing the choice of early voters. 1 A famous example is the. Voting behavior and economic conditions correlated at the national level but not at the individual level People understand what government can and cannot be held accountable for People see economic conditions as affecting them indirectly, even when they are doing well. The contracting efficiency hypothesis suggests that covenants will be designed to optimize the trade-off between their beneficial effects on ex ante debt costs and the costs of possible ex post operational and financial inefficiency. The latter can be moderated by appropriate choice of maturity and callable provisions, by: 1.

In the 8th century BC, Greece began to emerge from the Dark Ages, which followed the fall of the Mycenaean civilization. Literacy had been lost and Mycenaean script forgotten, but the Greeks adopted the Phoenician alphabet, modifying it to create the Greek alphabet. Take the test and see what else you remember about their history.3/5.   In the _____ model, voting is understood to be shaped by the rules of the system, by political party behavior, by the ways candidates . An ex ante moral hazard is a change in behavior prior to the outcome of the random event, whereas ex post involves behavior after the outcome. For example, in the case of a health insurance company insuring an individual during a specific time period, the final health of the individual can be thought of as the outcome. “ Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation,” with Ettore Damiano and Wing Suen. We study a model of collective decision making in which agents vote on the decision repeatedly until they agree, with the agents receiving no exogenous new information between two voting rounds but incurring a delay cost.

Strategic behavior and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model by A. Postlewaite Download PDF EPUB FB2

Abstract. A person is said to prefer in the stochastic dominance sense one lottery-over-outcomes over another lottery-over-outcomes if the probability of his (at least) first choice being selected in the first lottery is greater than or equal to the analogous probability in the second lottery, the probability of his at least second choice being selected in the first lottery is greater than or Cited by: Arrow'sParetoprinciple,whichisexpost,shouldbeimpliedby a reasonablenotion ofexante are suggesting that expost efficiency is.

Strategic Behaviour and a Notion of Ex Ante notion of ex ante efficiency in a model which admits such evaluations. (Since we are (voting rules). In order to evaluate ex ante and to compare the ~ormance of the two social choice functions some.

states that the size of a country's party system depends on the complex interplay of both social and institutional factors. Social divisions create the "demand" for political parties, and electoral institutions then determine the extent to which this demand is translated into parties that win votes (electoral parties) and parties that win seats (legislative parties).

Nash equilibrium has been tremendously useful in understanding economic problems in which strategic behavior is important. and a notion of ex ante efficiency.

Section 2 will introduce the strategic form which is a formal construct within which strategic behavior can be studied and Section 3 will discuss the most popular solution concept, Nash equilibrium. Finally, in Section 4, I will discuss strategic behavior in the commons problem.

Examples of GamesFile Size: KB. Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections • Bloc voting: each voter gives one point to each of k candidates.4 • Approval voting: each voter approves or disapproves any candidate; an approved candidate is awarded one point, and there is no limit to the number of candidates a voter can approve.

Voting Systems and Strategic Manipulation: an Experimental Study ⁄ Anna Bassiy September 1, Abstract This paper presents experiments analyzing the strategic behavior of voters under three voting systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count.

Strategic behavior is signiflcantly difierent under each treatment (voting system).File Size: KB. A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text.

A type of game in which the payoff matrix implies the following: Each player has an incentive, regardless of what the other player does, to cheat to take an.

This implies that the ex-post power relations matters exceedingly: the possession of the residual rights of control is key when, for example, an uncontracted eventuality occurs.

moreover, ex-post control rights may exert strong influence over ex-ante contractual arrangements (Epstein and O'Halloran, ). (c) Property rights are subject to Cited by: 4. Suppose a society has preferences for harmony with the parameter δ L = − y N. Under MV, the following voting behavior is optimal in the first ballot: (i) All minority members vote sincerely.

(ii) If y Author: Theresa C. Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach. In this section, we analyze the qualitative compatibility of the experimental observations with the predictions of the different theories. Proposals are denoted as (x p, x h, x l), where x p is the proposer's payoff, x h: = max{x 1, x 2} is the higher of the voters’ payoffs, and x l = min{x 1, x 2} is the lower of the voters’ 1 shows that the average payoffs of voters exceed Cited by: 2.

Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee.

In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting [ ]Cited by: "Overall, a first-rate resource, and yes, pleasantly readable." ―School Library Journal The Encyclopedia of U.S.

Campaigns, Elections, and Electoral Behavior covers virtually everything one would want to know about American political campaigns. With more than entries, these two comprehensive volumes present a significant array topics of campaigns, elections, and Format: Hardcover.

cal justification for the notion that candidates confront a credi The voting score data include (1) the actual roll-call data from ICPSR Study 4 “United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records,” (2) Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder’s [] Cited by: We need to find “convenient” representations for our purposes Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections A follow-up on previous work by Ariel Procaccia, Aviv Zohar and Jeffrey S.

Rosenschein Lecture content definitions previous work problems left open by previous work more definitions 3½ theorems and proofs results and summary Voting A. complemented by policy design and appraisal techniques that are usually based upon a notion of allocative efficiency and some form of ex-ante cost-benefit analysis (CBA).

Costs (includ-ing the costs of potential government failure) are usually defined by their opportunity cost, by: 1. As shown in Model 3, the model fit improves significantly over Model 1 with this specification (Δχ 2 =p = ), and the coefficients for both the CEO relative pay below mean group (β = −, p = ) and the CEO relative pay above mean group (β = −, p = ) were negative and statistically significant.

Additionally Author: F. Scott Bentley, Ingrid S. Fulmer, Ingrid S. Fulmer, Rebecca R. Kehoe. The rest of the lecture is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model with many regions, each of them with projects that produce local benefits to the region and externalities to other regions.

Section 3 uses a strategic assumption about voting procedures that ensures that the median voter theorem literally applies. This allows me Author: Jaume Ventura. Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting Steven Callander.

Northwestern University. the belief that the chosen candidate is the better one is π (g) and so, ex ante, the expectation the best candidate will be picked is π (g). A notable simplification of the model is the sole focus on the strategic behaviour of voters.

In Cited by: We study games with incomplete information from a point of view which emphasizes the empirical predictions arising from game-theoretic models.

Using the notion of “distributional” strategies, we prove four main theorems: (i) a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem, (ii) a pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem, (iii) a pure-strategy ϵ-equilibrium existence theorem, Cited by: a model predicting consumers’ conservation behavioral intention may contain a moral dimension, which is positively related to con-sumers’ conservation behavioral intention.

Visiting green hotels is a behavior containing elements of personal morality and social responsibility. Thus, the main aim of this study is to use the. On this basis, the expected number of votes for the hispanic candidate in precinct i is pnh i Cqn a i.

Then p and q can be estimated by doing some kind of regression of v on nh and na. More recently, King published “a solution to the ecological inference problem”.

Institutional Model of Voting In the institutional model, voting is understood to be shaped by the rules of the system, by political party behavior, by the way candidates run their campaigns, and the context of the election.

In other words, the political environment helps shape participation. Close races are exciting, so every vote counts. Efforts by groups and organizations to motivate.

ment intervention will always result in a reduction in economic efficiency in regulated markets. voting paradox will prevent voters from selecting the best person for public office.

The public choice model raises questions about the government's ability to regulate economic activity efficiently. In the _____ model, voting is understood to be shaped by the rules of the system, by political party behavior, by the ways candidates run their campaigns, and by the context of.

that the main source of such advantage comes from the strategic behavior of the par-ties, which help their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring that they be placed rst on the ballot.

Thus, this paper identi es the actions of parties as a source of incumbency advantage worth considering, especially in high-stakes elections whereCited by: 2. The Simple Economics Series is a collection of information that explains, in plain English, the fundamentals of personal economics and theory.

If you enjoy this type of post or personal economics see the entire series here. Basic Premise of Theory The theory of planned behavior addresses the underlying influencing factors that precede and predict an individual’s (or.

" a compelling and innovative book on elections and political party competition in France, Great Britain, and the United States. It unites theoretical modeling and data analysis to help us understand how parties in multiparty democracies compete when citizens both are partisan and care about the issue positions of the parties.

Biography. Dr. Urs Gasser is the Executive Director of the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University and a Professor of Practice at Harvard Law research and teaching activities focus on information law, policy, and society issues and the changing role of academia in the digitally networked with one party for one office and with another party for other offices.

it has become the norm in American voting behavior party machines a type of political party organization that relies heavily on material inducements, such as patronage, to win votes and to govern.The voting model carries out time steps every election and is inline with the time-scale found from the Markov model analysis.

We then compare our voting model to the election averages to investigate di erent national voting behaviours. Neither the Markov model or voting model takes the choice of constitution into account, even though it.